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Abstract
Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential (con-
scious) phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from con-
scious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost
everything (if not everything) has intentionality – all the way down to subatomic particles. Sec-
ond, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of it – per-
haps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly naturalistic theory of intentional-
ity is (1) a realistic conception of naturalism and (2) a properly developed understanding of
the phenomenon of cognitive experience.
1. ‘Intentionality’, ‘Experience’,
‘Physicalism’ and ‘Naturalism’
My subject is concrete intentionality, intentionality considered as a real,
concrete physical-world phenomenon, something that can be correctly
attributed to (states of or occurrences in) concrete entities like ourselves
and dogs. I’m not concerned with intentionality considered as a property of
entities like propositions.
Since I’m only concerned with concrete intentionality in this sense, I’ll simply
call it ‘intentionality’. My question is:
[1] What is intentionality? What is it for intentionality to exist?
I take this to be a straightforwardly metaphysical question.
I’m going to assume that conscious experiential states can and do have in-
tentionality, in the fullest possible sense, and argue that all intentionality
involves consciousness, or conscious experience, or experience; whichever
term you prefer. I will use the terms ‘experience’ (taken as a mass term)
and ‘experiential phenomena’. I will use them to refer specifically and only
to the experiential qualitative character of conscious mental phenomena: to
the phenomenon of experiential what-it’s-likeness whose nature is clearly
and accurately understood by everyone in the world except a few philoso-
phers.
I assume that physicalism and naturalism are true, but I haven’t yet floated
completely off the planet (unlike many who call themselves ‘physicalists’ or
‘naturalists’) and so I am of course an outright realist about experience.
2. ‘Intentionality’, ‘Aboutness’
What is intentionality? What is it for intentionality to exist? Consider, first,
the well known distinction between underived (‘original’, ‘intrinsic’) inten-
tionality and derived intentionality. The paradigm cases of underived inten-
tionality are conscious or experiential states. The paradigm cases of de-
rived intentionality (which is of course derived from underived intentiona-
lity) are things like books, roadsigns, pictures, computers, programmed ro-
bots and so on. Dennett and his followers reject the distinction, because it
marks no real line on their view, but it does not beg any questions in the
present context and I am going to take its viability for granted simply in or-
der to put aside all the phenomena of derived intentionality; they are not
of any great philosophical interest.
Many people equate intentionality with aboutness, and the derived/unde-
rived distinction applies to aboutness just as well as it does to intentional-
ity, but I am now going to distinguish the two things. I accept of course that
intentionality (I) entails aboutness (A):
[I → A]
but deny that aboutness entails intentionality:
[A → I].
Books, films, pictures, and so on are certainly about things, but they cer-
tainly do not involve intentionality, on my terms. This is a terminological
decision that I find helpful, and I hope you will too.
There is plenty of aboutness in the world, on these terms, but a lot less in-
tentionality; for all intentionality involves aboutness, while not all about-
ness involves intentionality. The natural question, then, is
[2] What does aboutness have to be like to be or involve intentionality?
and the first part of the answer is immediate: only underived aboutness can
qualify as genuine intentionality.
This raises the question whether underived aboutness is not only necessary
but also sufficient for intentionality. And this in turn raises the question
[3] What sorts of underived aboutness are there?
We know that there is experiential underived aboutness, for the paradigm
of genuine intentionality remains experiential underived intentionality, which
entails experiential underived aboutness, so the question now is whether
there is also non-experiential underived aboutness. Or, to put it slightly dif-
ferently,
[4] Can there be underived aboutness in a non-experiential being–UNA for
short?
This, I believe, is the key question in the current context of debate.
Many take it that the answer to [4] is Yes: UNA can and does exist. A pud-
dle, for example, may reflect San Vitale, and in that sense genuinely con-
tain or constitute a representation of San Vitale. A mirror may reflect an
image of you, so that it is natural to say that there is a representation of
you right in front of you. Some are happy to say that certain of the states of
phototropic beetles represent light, or at least represent certain opportuni-
ties for behaviour, even if the beetles are experienceless. Perhaps we can
also say that the fingerprint on this guitar has aboutness; certainly it carries
information that uniquely identifies you. Many are inclined to say the same
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about tree rings that carry information about climate and the tree’s age. It
is arguable that everything is about everything else, for according to Ma-
ch’s Principle ‘the slopping of your drink in [a] lurching aeroplane is attri-
butable to the influence of all the matter in the universe’.
This might be going too far (we shall see), but some of these UNA claims
seem uncontroversial and natural, and their naturalness, combined with
the standard outright identification of intentionality with aboutness, can
seem to sweep us smoothly into a view of things according to which the es-
sentially mental phenomenon of intentionality seems essentially similar to,
deeply continuous with, forms of aboutness that are underived and that
occur in non-experiential beings (i.e. UNA) in such a way that both are
correctly classified as genuine intentionality.
I agree that there are important similarities and continuities between our-
selves and experienceless phototropic beetles, TV cameras, heat-seeking
missiles, thermometers, and so on. And I’m quite certain that I don’t dis-
agree on any actual matter of fact with those who like to say that states of
robots, microbes, grass, thermometers and so on can have intentionality. I
don’t, however, think that saying this is a good way to characterize the
similarities between ourselves and these things. I think, in fact, that the
best thing to say may be that there is no UNA at all: that, once we put
philosophically uninteresting derived aboutness aside, no states of non-ex-
periential beings are ever really about anything at all.
– How can this be right? Consider a crack in the curtains that functions fortuitously as a cam-
era obscura, casting a perfect upside-down image (representation) of the view from a window
onto the opposite wall. Surely this is a case of UNA? Consider a camera functioning on its
own, taking photographs and films that are indisputably about or of things. You don’t need to
have someone who intends to take a photograph of X, or indeed of anything, to get a photo-
graph of X. It’s true that cameras are designed to do what they do, and this can seem to be a
reason for saying that films and photographs have derived aboutness, but a thing physically
identical to a functioning camera could conceivably come into existence by cosmic accident
and produce admirable films and photographs of things. These would be about things and
they would no more have derived aboutness than all the naturally occurring camerae obscurae
in the world.
Consider R1, an experienceless robot that travels round a room littered with multicoloured
geometrical shapes picking up all and only the purple pyramids and dropping them in a box,
thereby replenishing its energy supply. R1, also known as Luke, was built and programmed by
us to perform the pyramid task straight out of the box, and may accordingly be said to have
derived aboutness. But there is also R2, hardware-identical to R1 but ‘programmed’ entirely
by a freak burst of radiation that makes it software-identical and hence behaviourally identical
to R1. Then there is R3, hardware-identical to R1 and programmed by us, not in such a way
that it can perform the pyramid task straight off, but rather in such a way that it learns to per-
form the pyramid task. Then, importantly, there is R4, also known as Fluke, physically (hard-
ware and software) identical to R1 although it came into existence by cosmic fluke. Finally,
R5, another product of cosmic accident that is physically (hardware and software) identical to
R3. I assume you will allow derived aboutness to R1 and perhaps R3, but how, as they con-
tinue to function perfectly over the years, are you going to deny underived aboutness, UNA,
to the rest of them? Surely they are all indisputably in states that represent purple pyramids
and all sorts of other things and are about these things?
I know it can seem natural to say this. But if you insist on talking in this
way, as is of course your terminological right, then I think you will find
there is just too much UNA, more than you can handle.
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3. The Ubiquity of UNA
As far as I can see, this follows almost immediately from some very general
considerations about causation and information. I take it, to begin, that
[1] there are objectively legitimate ways of cutting the world, the world-
flow, into causes and effects
and that this can be done in such a way that
[2] the things picked out as effects are reliable signs of the things picked
out as their causes
and that in this sense
[3] every effect may be said to ‘carry information’ about its cause.
It may be, in fact, that there is a way of cutting the world into causes and
effects in such a way that
[4] every effect carries uniquely identifying information about its cause.
But whether or not this is so – it doesn’t matter if it isn’t – it seems plausi-
ble, to expand [3], that
[5] every effect can be said to carry information about its cause, and in that
sense to be about its cause, and in that sense to represent its cause,
and therefore that
[6] UNA is utterly ubiquitous.
The first objection is likely to be that if one is going to talk in this way then
one has to acknowledge that there is aboutness and aboutness, and that not
all aboutness is aboutness of the kind we care about when we are interes-
ted in content, intentionality, and so on; and that this is so even when we
are concerned only with UNA. On this view, the alleged UNA of the flight
of a kicked ball that, on the present view, carries information about its
cause and can in that sense be said to be about – to carry or constitute a
representation of – its cause is of a completely different order from the
UNA of a reflection of the moon in a puddle, or an image of the moon
produced by a (fluke) camera. The puddle and camera cases are somehow
special, and involve real representation, while the football case doesn’t.
This seems at first an intuitive distinction. The question is whether it can
be defended in such a way as to stop the supposedly more special cases of
UNA from being swallowed up in the ubiquitous UNA of the whole heav-
ing universe. I don’t think it can. If we find the UNA of the puddle or the
fluke camera image special it is because we are overcome, as so often, by
the vividness of light-involving cases which we assimilate to our experience
of vision. In order to find a candidate for moon-aboutness in the puddle we
have to imagine an observer, and an observer in a particular position (the-
re are – infinitely – many ways of looking at the puddle that do not render
an image of the moon). This is because all that we have, in fact, in the case
of the puddle, is a body of water and the incidence upon and reflection by
its surface of certain wavelengths of light, and when we consider it this way,
taking, as it were, the ‘view from nowhere’, it seems that we face a choice.
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Either there is no good reason to say that there is anything here that is
about anything or intrinsically a representation of anything, or, if we allow
that there is good reason to say this, then there is certainly no more reason
to say it when considering the incidence and reflection of light waves than
when considering the incidence and reflection of sound waves, or indeed
the causal impacts of anything on the puddle. In fact, as far as I can see,
there is in the case of any entity X and any possible physical effect of X on
the puddle a possible observer who, on detecting this effect, naturally expe-
riences it as being or giving rise to a representation of something, and in-
deed as a representation of X or an X-type thing. What distinguishes us is
simply that we feel particularly happy and familiar with visual cases or
cases analogous to visual cases.
The case of the photograph may seem more compelling than that of the
puddle, but here again we are overimpressed by a light-involving case as-
similable to vision, and here too we have to introduce a possible sighted
observer to give body to the idea that we have some special sort of about-
ness and not just a certain sort of effect, one among trillions, that is no
more (and if you like no less) intrinsically about anything or a representa-
tion of something than the flight of the ball or the shape of the weather-
worn rock or the sonic effects of the traffic on the puddle or the precise na-
ture and pattern of the digestive processes now occurring in someone’s ali-
mentary canal. The universe is alive with information transfer; some say
that it consists of (concrete) information and information transfer. And if
information transfer requires representation, then representation is every-
where, and so is aboutness, and there is no way of holding on to cases like
the photo while ruling out almost everything else. Conclusion: if UNA ex-
ists, it is ubiquitous. If any photo has it, so does any photon.
Some philosophers (e.g. defenders of ‘teleological’ theories of content)
may now say that there is something very special about the representa-
tional states of biological entities (at present we are considering only ex-
perienceless ones) because they were ‘designed’ by evolution for specific
tasks. But there is no deep difference here, in the great story of the uni-
verse. Nor will any such biological criterion distinguish light-detecting sta-
tes of experienceless phototropic beetles from states of developing foetuses
that appear to engage in fiendishly cunning behaviour in the womb (pursu-
ing, roughly, the be-as-selfish-as-possible-short-of-killing-your-host strategy).
Defenders of teleological theories of content will also have to accept that
experienceless beings can have aboutness if naturally evolved while their
cosmic-accident perfect duplicates can’t – ever. They will have to accept
that naturally evolved experiencing beings like Freddy the frog, Fido and
myself can have aboutness and intentionality, while our cosmic-accident
Twins can’t – ever. This seems awfully unfair (fabulously counterintuitive).
Other philosophers try to narrow things down in another way: by according
special status to representational states in individuals that depend on some
kind of ontogenetic learning process (I’m allowing that experienceless enti-
ties can learn), and not on something entirely hard-wired; but the case is at
bottom the same.
Others again seek to restrict the class of entities that can be said to have in-
tentionality or aboutness – and a fortiori UNA – in a ‘functionalist’ way.
On this view a state of or episode in an entity X has aboutness only if it has
some functional role in X: only if it is disposed to interact with other fea-
tures of X and thereby affect X’s behaviour. But this imposes no significant
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restriction at all if we take the notion of function generally, i.e. in a non-
normative way that does not tie the very general notion of function to the
very specific notion of contributing to X’s survival or flourishing; it lets in
atoms as automatically as animals. If instead we take the notion of function
normatively, it appears to render the idea of God’s intentionality (about-
ness) incoherent. God aside, a conscious, cognitively sophisticated ‘Pure
Observer’ or ‘Weather Watcher’, a being constitutionally incapable of any
sort of adaptive behaviour, could conceivably come into existence and en-
ter into many intentional/aboutness states although none of them ever had
or could have anything to do with its survival or wellbeing.
Another popular suggestion has been that aboutness comes on the scene
only when we can make sense of the idea that X (or states of or episodes in
X) can be said to misrepresent something. There has been a great quantity
of sophisticated argument about what is required for the notion of mis-
representation to be properly applicable, and it seems clear enough that it
does impose a significant restriction on candidates for aboutness. It seems
clear that the puddle’s representation of the moon doesn’t pass the test, for
example, along with almost all the rest of the causation in the universe.
One problem with this idea, however (and very briefly), is that the discus-
sion of has tended to take it for granted that we need a survival-and-
wellbeing-based normative notion of function in order to make sense of
the notion of misrepresentation (it has focused on finding the minimal case
of aboutness, canvassing frogs, robots, bacteria and such like). This cannot
be right, for there is again no incoherence in the idea of a Pure Observer
who can represent and misrepresent, and know it, in a way completely
unconnected with survival and wellbeing. The Pure Observers show with
great clarity that intentionality and aboutness can exist in cases where there
is no question of (normative) function. They are, however, fatal to a whole
realm of theories, and are therefore fogged over for many philosophers.
– I don’t have to consider such a case in trying to give a ‘naturalistic’ account of intentionality
because it’s not a case that involves a natural being.
Many would say that this objection misunderstands the philosophical prob-
lem of giving a naturalistic/physicalist account of intentionality. To allow it
is to let naturalism come apart from physicalism in such a way that the
problem of giving a physicalist–real physicalist–account of intentionality re-
mains.
It seems, further, that even if we accept the tie between aboutness and mis-
representation (± normative function) it won’t stop UNA spreading every-
where. We can make sense of the idea that an X-type particle might go
anomalously into state S1, a state that it normally goes into only when in-
teracting with a Y-type particle, even though it has not interacted with a
Y-type particle, and on one view this is already enough for misrepresenta-
tion. We can further suppose that the X particle normally goes into S2
when and only when it has gone into S1, and that going into S2 in the ab-
sence of a Y particle shortens its ‘life’, and is in that sense dysfunctional for
it, although its tendency to go into S2 on going into S1 is not the product of
any process of evolution by natural selection. So too a non-self-moving or-
ganism like a tree can be in the state it would have been in if it had been
exposed to certain environmental conditions (its propensity to go into that
state in those conditions being an evolved response) although those condi-
tions do not obtain; and it can react inappropriately – fatally so – in conse-
quence of this ‘misrepresentation’.
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It may be said that this kind of case is irrelevant, because we are interested
in ‘purposive’ behaviour, pursuit of goals, and so on. But this fact about hu-
man interests can’t ground any kind of metaphysically solid distinction.
Any line that we try to draw between purposive behaviour and non-purposive
behaviour in the domain of the experienceless (for we are still in pursuit of
UNA) will once again be wholly a matter of anthropomorphic/zoomorphic
human prejudice. There is no metaphysically fundamental line to be drawn
between the complex reactive behaviour of a developing embryo, which
can look intensely and sophisticatedly goal-directed, or indeed of any self-
maintaining system like an individual cell (or any of its biologically distin-
guishable subparts) and the ‘purposiveness’ of an undesigned robot like
Fluke or – supposing for the sake of argument that birds are experienceless
– a nesting bird. It is just that we find it more intuitive to call the latter be-
haviour ‘purposive’, given the biases built into our (zoomorphic) interests
and ways of understanding things. We naturally favour things that move
around on their own in pursuit of things in their environment, for example,
over embryos and cells.
One proposal, then, is that misrepresentation goes all the way down, in
which case the misrepresentation requirement places no significant restric-
tion on UNA. One may counter this by stipulating that misrepresentation
(and so aboutness) can only occur in entities to whom the very specific
survival-and-wellbeing-related notion of normative function applies, and
this is a pretty good first shot at a significant restriction on genuine about-
ness, for it excludes about 99.9 recurring per cent of all the candidate cases
of UNA in the universe. It isn’t enough, though, for it still lets through a
vast array of the states of the embryo that govern its complex reactive be-
haviour, not to mention states of individual cells and their biologically dis-
tinguishable subparts. It seems that yet another restriction is needed to get
us anywhere near a satisfactorily limited notion of UNA: restriction to a
certain subclass of phenomena that we happen to find particularly interest-
ing and intuitively classify as instances of ‘purposive behaviour’. But this re-
striction simply begs the question, and is completely arbitrary from a meta-
physical point of view.
Other reasons can no doubt be given for discerning UNA only at certain
special points in the great nexus of cause and efect, but I think they are
bound to be metaphysically superficial, for reasons just given. The idea
needs development, but it is I think plain. It’s not as if it can be under-
mined by special theories of causation. Nor does it depend on determin-
ism. Even if determinism is false and there are events that carry no infor-
mation about the past there are innumerable events that do, and the claim
remains the same: if there is any underived aboutness to be found in non-
experiential beings then it is all pervasive.
And that’s only the half of it. The problem is not only that almost every-
thing (if not everything) has aboutness, it’s also that everything that has it
has far too much of it – perhaps an infinite amount. Suppose E carries in-
formation about D (with sufficiently detailed information about E we can
know that D happened because only a D could have brought about E) and
that the same goes for D and C, C and B, B and A. In that case the same
also goes also for E and A and all stations in between and beyond.
I will return to this second problem of excess shortly. So far we have the
idea that if UNA exists at all it is all pervasive.
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How should we treat this conclusion? We could contrapose. We could raise
our hands in supplication and confess that it’s all too much – that the best
thing to say (the only sensible thing to say, given our starting theoretical in-
terest in intentionality) is that there isn’t really any such thing as UNA,
there isn’t ever any real or true underived aboutness in a non-experiential
being. I think this is a natural terminological reaction, and the most intui-
tive in certain contexts, if only because it allows one to withdraw the rejec-
tion of [A → I] that must have seemed so unnatural to many in ß2. For the
moment, though, I am going to take the second option of continuing to
allow that there is UNA while insisting that [a] it falls infinitely short of any
kind of genuine intentionality and that [b] it is utterly ubiquitous, if it exists
at all, in such a way that none of the usually favoured candidates – states of
naturally evolved experienceless organisms, cosmic-accident robots, and so
on – are special in any way at all, as compared with kicked footballs, rip-
ples in ponds, gravitational effects, and so on. There is, I suggest, no sig-
nificant or substantive metaphysical line, of the sort that one would
expect when dealing with a fundamental, real-world, concrete phenome-
non like intentionality, to be drawn between the sense in which states of a
purposively efficient naturally evolved experienceless organism or cos-
mic-accident-programmed robot can be said to be about purple pyramids
and the sense in which any effect is about its cause(s). There are plenty of
compelling, intuitive, anthropomorphizing, human-interest, purposive-
behaviour-focused lines to be drawn between the two cases, but that is
really quite another matter.
The choice is stark. Either Dennett is right – there’s really no such thing as
intentionality, it’s just natural and useful to talk in such terms when ex-
plaining and predicting the behaviour of certain things – or I am right that
there really is intentionality, but that all intentionality is experiential. The-
re is no middle ground – and this is something about which Dennett, unlike
so many others, has always been very clear.
(But I know that my conscious thoughts really are about particular things
as a matter of physical and metaphysical fact, quite independently of any
explanation and prediction of my behaviour. I know it as certainly as I
know that I exist. And you know the same about yourself. So Dennett is
wrong! Intentionality is a real, wholly objective, concretely existing phe-
nomenon. QED.)
But if experience is necessary for this thing I’m calling ‘intentionality’, what
exactly do I have in mind? What is the nature of the relation between expe-
rience and this thing that makes the former necessary for the latter, whet-
her we are thinking about a purple pyramid we can see right in front of us,
the church of San Vitale a thousand miles away, the tallest tree in the
Amazonian jungle, p, W. V. Quine’s second-best sloop, marshmallow cam-
shafts, or round squares? What exactly does your and my conscious think-
ing about the pyramid add to whatever it is in robots like Luke and Fluke
that is involved in their efficient and successful search for the pyramid and
their depositing of it in a designated box? What exactly does my conscious
experience add to my thinking about p, given that Luke and Fluke (equip-
ped with a maths module) are now smoothly engaged in calculating p’s
decimal expansion? To answer this question I must first say something
about cognitive experience.
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4. Cognitive Experience
When people today talk of experience, of experiential qualitative content,
EQ content for short, they standardly have in mind only things like sensa-
tions and sensory images, emotional feelings and moods considered (so far
as they can be) just in respect of their non-cognitive felt character – all of
which I will bring, for the purposes of the present discussion, under the
heading ‘sensory EQ content’ or ‘sensory experience’. This is most unfortu-
nate, because there is also non-sensory EQ content, cognitive EQ content,
cognitive phenomenology, cognitive experience, and it is analytically speak-
ing quite distinct from sensory EQ content or sensory experience although
the two things are profoundly undisentanglable in daily life. The existence
of cognitive experience, of cognitive, non-sensory EQ content, is hopelessly
obvious to unprejudiced reflection, for it fills almost every moment of our
lives. In analytic philosophy, however, its existence is very often denied or
at least ignored, even when the existence of sensory experience is con-
ceded.
(Remember that the words ‘experience’ and ‘experiential’ have been de-
fined as referring only to the phenomenon of the experiential qualitative
character of conscious mental phenomena. For purposes of emphasis I will
sometimes speak pleonastically of the ‘(experiential) qualitative character
of experience’.)
The term ‘cognitive experience’ covers every aspect of experience that goes
beyond sensory experience considered just as such. Quantitatively speak-
ing, it covers the vast bulk of our experience. The cognitive EQ content of
experience goes far, far beyond sensory experience, and is central to almost
everything in our lives. Here, however, I am particularly interested in the
cognitive experience involved in comprehendingly entertaining propositions
in reading, writing, listening, or thinking, and I am going to limit my atten-
tion to this.
I have argued the point elsewhere and will be brief. You are now under-
standing this very sentence. Clearly this understanding – it is going on right
now – is part of the character of the current course of your experience. It is, to
put it pleonastically, part of the experiential character, the EQ character,
of your current experience. Your experience in the last few seconds would
have been very different if the last two sentences had been ‘The objection
to the Realist Regularity theory of causation is very simple. It is that the
theory is utterly implausible in asserting categorically that there is no rea-
son in the nature of things for the regularity of the world.’ And the diffe-
rence wouldn’t have been merely auditory. It’s the conceptual content of
the sentences – and now of this very sentence – that plays the dominant
part in determining the overall character of this particular stretch of the
course of your experience, although you may also be aware of many other
things. Consider (experience) the difference, for you, between my saying
‘I’m reading War and Peace’ and ‘barath abalori trafalon’. In both cases you
experience sounds, but in the first case you experience something more:
you have understanding-experience, cognitive experience. Cognitive expe-
rience of the sort I am focusing on at present is a matter of whatever EQ
content is involved in episodes of consciously entertaining and understand-
ing specific cognitive or conceptual contents after one has subtracted any
sensory EQ-content trappings or shadings or accompaniments that such
episodes may have.
289SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA G. Strawson, Real Intentionality v.2:40 (2/2005) pp. (279–297) Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness?
Here is another proof of its existence. Have you really been having merely
sensory experience for the last two minutes? That’s a rhetorical question and
the answer is of course not. But if there’s no such thing as cognitive experi-
ence the answer is certainly Yes. One can imagine the rhetorical question
being interrupted…. Have you really RELIGIOUS DISSENT had nothing
WILLIAM JAMES’S PLUMBER’S BILL but sensory experience SHOW
ME SOME DARK MATTER for the last thirty seconds? If there’s no
such thing as cognitive experience the answer is certainly Yes….
I think that the main difficulty that philosophers have with the idea of cog-
nitive EQ content derives from the fact that they fail to distinguish it
sharply from cognitive content. So let it be said: cognitive EQ content is not
cognitive content. Suppose you think consciously The average distance from
the moon to the earth is 238888 miles. What is the cognitive EQ content of
this thought-episode? Well, consider your ‘Twin-Earth’ Twin, your ‘Brain-
-in-a-Vat’ Twin and your ‘Instant’ Twin who has just now popped flukishly
into being. By hypothesis, all three of them have exactly the same thought-ex-
perience, the same cognitive EQ content, as you, and the cognitive EQ con-
tent of your thought-episode is precisely what you have in common with
them, experientially speaking.
So much for your thought-episode’s cognitive EQ content. What, now, of
its cognitive content?
Accounts differ. According to one central account cognitive content, what-
ever the details of its nature, is something that is essentially semantically
evaluable, evaluable as true or false, accurate or inaccurate. This is the ac-
count that will concern me.
There is a different, fashionable account I mention to put aside: the exter-
nalist, direct-reference, ‘representationalist’, Russellian (etc.) account, ac-
cording to which the cognitive content of the thought-episode consists of
the moon itself, the earth itself, and the distance between them itself, or
the state of affairs that consists of the moon’s being this far from the earth.
Since the moon and the earth are not semantically evaluable entities, or
representational entities, or mental entities, being things that could exist
without there being any minds or representations at all, they are in no dan-
ger (one lives in hope) of being confused with the EQ content of a
thought-episode, which is an essentially mental phenomenon that could
not exist if there were no minds at all. I take it, accordingly, that the danger
of failing to distinguish cognitive EQ content sharply from cognitive con-
tent arises only when cognitive content is at least taken to be something se-
mantically evaluable and hence something that represents something, and
hence something that is as a representation ontologically distinct from
what it represents. The possibility of confusion is then provided for, be-
cause we also often take mental phenomena to represent something – and
to be of course ontologically distinct from what they represent. (Note that
both sorts of cognitive content can happily coexist, so long as they do not
insist on being called the same thing, and they can equally well coexist with
cognitive EQ content. In the case of my thinking The average distance from
the moon to the earth is 238888 miles, there is [1] the Russellian cognitive
content, i.e. the moon, the earth, and so on plus [2] the cognitive EQ con-
tent, i.e. that which I share fully with my Twins plus [3] the semantically
evaluable cognitive content, i.e. that feature of my thought, whatever your
preferred theory of its nature, in virtue of which my thought has the pro-
perty (which it certainly has) of being able to be true or false.)
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It remains only to say that the cognitive EQ content of my thought-episode,
which is by hypothesis identical to the cognitive EQ content of my Twins’
real or apparent thought-episodes, is in itself no more semantically evalu-
able than sensory EQ content is – by which I mean sensory EQ content con-
sidered just as such, i.e. entirely independently of its causes. Cognitive EQ
content is just a matter of the qualitative character of experience and the
fundamental block to understanding it clearly and distinguishing it cleanly
from cognitive content is simply a profoundly inadequate (because merely
sensory) conception of the (experiential) qualitative character of experience.
I don’t see how there can be any real progress with the problem of inten-
tionality until we acquire or recover a good grasp of the reality of cognitive
EQ content and its all-importance in human life. The key to the problem
of intentionality (including the supposed problem of intentionality with re-
spect to so-called ‘non-existent objects’) lies here, and yet many analytic
philosophers deny the existence of cognitive EQ content, making a mistake
comparable to the mistake made by those by no means entirely legendary
philosophers who thought that thinking was wholly a matter of having ima-
ges in the head.
We may now return to the question raised at the end of ß3: What is the re-
lation between experience and intentionality?
5. What is the Relation Between
Experience and Intentionality?
Lucy and Louis, who live in the real world, as we do, are having qualita-
tively identical experience – call it ‘M-experience’. It is experience just like
experience of thinking about, or perhaps visualizing, a moose. In fact it is
just like the experience someone might have if thinking about, or visuali-
zing, a certain real moose, Mandy, M for short. And in fact Lucy’s M-
experience has normal causal links to seeing M or pictures of M, or reading
about M. Louis’s M-experience, by contrast, and his whole accompanying
M-experience-related dispositional set, which I assume to be identical to
Lucy’s, are caused by a freak brainstorm. He has had no contact with
moose, still less M.
Lucy’s M-experience is about M; it has classic intentionality with respect to
M. Louis’s M-experience isn’t; it has no intentionality with respect to M. It
is not about any concrete object, although Louis thinks it is. So the two ex-
periences differ dramatically in their intentionality. But the only relevant
difference between them lies in their causes. It does not (by hypothesis) lie
in their intrinsic EQ character as experiences. Nor is there any difference
between Lucy and Louis so far as their relevant behavioural dispositions
(including their mental-activity dispositions) are concerned, for I have sup-
posed that they are identical in this respect. It is simply the difference in
the causes of their experiences that makes the difference in respect of
M-intentionality. And this causal difference is not itself philosophically
mysterious. It is not significantly different from the causal difference that
explains why this picture is a picture of Isaiah Berlin (it is a photograph or
portrait of Isaiah Berlin), whereas this qualitatively identical picture is not,
since it is a work of pure imagination or a complex accident of paint.
We have, then, a very plain causal factor, and it raises a problem that is fa-
miliar from other causal theories like the causal theory of perception. For
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the fact is that Lucy’s thought is about Mandy. It is not about the neuronal
happenings that directly causally precede and precipitate the (neural hap-
penings that are the) thought, for example. Nor is it about the light waves
and optic-nerve electrical activity that are causally involved in Lucy’s com-
ing to know about M by seeing or reading about her. Her thought is quite
unequivocally about M rather than any of these other things. This is not
merely some kind of natural interpretation of the situation, some kind of
‘intentional-stance’ hypothesis. It is an immoveable objective fact, however
inconvenient it is (you may test it by thinking of an absent friend).
But what makes Lucy’s thought unequivocally about M and M alone? How
do we – how does intentionality – know where to stop? We may compare
the question of what justifies our taking photographs and sound recordings
to be only of things that are located at a certain stage in their causation. Is
it an immoveable objective fact that this is what they are of or about, inde-
pendently of what we human beings take them to be about, or do we find
such objective facts only in cases like Lucy’s?
The problem of where to stop (how to stop) is, as just remarked, a routine
problem in theories that have a causal component. It certainly doesn’t con-
stitute a difficulty that is peculiar to the present account of intentionality.
On the contrary: it is precisely the stopping problem that justifies the pre-
sent account’s insistence on the necessity of experience. For we need an
account of how, given all its causes, Lucy’s thought manages to be only and
precisely about M. And here we reach the crux: it is precisely the EQ char-
acter of her experience, and in particular her cognitive experience, that
allows us to stop at a certain specific point as we proceed down the chain of
causes – in a way that nothing else can. How can it do this? Because the EQ
character of her experience includes her sense, her conception, of what
particular thing – M – her experience is about; it includes her taking her ex-
perience to be experience of a certain particular thing. It is this taking,
which is part of the EQ character or content of her experience, and in particu-
lar the cognitive-experiential character or content of her experience, that
settles the question, given her causal context, of which of her thought’s
causal antecedents her thought is about – in a way that nothing else can.
Her experience is a real, concrete, natural, empirical phenomenon, albeit
not one that is open to public inspection, and its EQ character, cognitive or
otherwise, is equally a concrete empirical phenomenon, albeit one that is
not open to public inspection.
Consider a simple perceptual case. There is a glass in front of you. You are
thinking about it and it alone. How can you do this? What makes it the
case that you are thinking about the glass, rather than about the neural
activity immediately preceding your thought, or the stimulus pattern on
your retina, or the glass reflected light waves a metre away from your eye?
There are really only two candidates in play. Either it is [1] the EQ charac-
ter, and in particular the cognitive EQ content, of your current experience
– the fact that your experience includes your taking it to be experience of a
certain thing (note that one does not have to posit any kind of higher-order
experience to account for this ‘taking’; the taking in question is simply built
in to the character of the experience). Or it is [2] your current overall be-
havioural disposition, plus anything else about you that anyone wants to
cite so long as it excludes [1], the very existence of which is denied by many
participants in the debate.
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It is, however, silly to think that behaviour can settle this question. It is not
really a candidate at all. It has seemed to be a candidate (when the ques-
tion has been faced at all) only because many have either denied the exis-
tence of EQ character outright, or have allowed it but denied that it is in
any way relevant to the question of intentionality. Consider the experience-
less, pyramid-fixated robot. It may be overwhelmingly natural for us to say
that certain of the states that it is in when it is interacting with purple pyra-
mids – I’ll call them P-states, where P-states are understood to be identified
by their intrinsic or non-relational character – are about the pyramids, given
how it behaves (it picks up the pyramid and drops it in the box). But this
behaviour doesn’t really show that its P-states are about the pyramid in any
sense in which they are not equally about the proximal inputs to its central
control system, or about what causally precedes those inputs by 50 ms, and
so on. One can train the robot in a virtual environment on an electronic
simulator until it is rich in P-states and many other such states (R-states for
red spheres, to be avoided, B-states for blue cubes, to be ignored), and
then transfer it into an exactly matching physically real environment in
which there are purple pyramids, red spheres, blue cubes. (An alternative
is that its software configuration is a product of cosmic fluke.) Its P-states
are not about the real pyramids before it is transferred, and the transfer,
the embedding in the real world, cannot make it true that its P-states are
now about the pyramid in any sense in which they are not equally about the
proximal inputs to its control system, or whatever immediately causally
precedes the proximal inputs; and so on. Nor can there be any sense in
which it is wrong about what its states are about.
You have to choose, as already remarked. Either experience is essential to
intentionality, or Dennett is right across the board and there is really no
such thing as intentionality: there are no matters of fact about intentiona-
lity, all attributions of intentionality are just a matter of theoretical conven-
ience. There is no tenable middle ground. (It will not help to include lin-
guistic behaviour, or appeal to facts about the public nature of language.)
This returns us to the second problem of excess, the problem that if there
is UNA then anything that has it has far too much of it (the first problem is
that if anything has UNA then everything or almost everything does).
Compare what happens when we, brought up in the real world, are switched
unknowingly onto a perfect simulator. We are then wrong, completely
wrong, about what our thoughts and experiences are about. We can get
things completely wrong because there are hard, wholly non-behavioural,
real-world, concrete facts about what we take our experiences to be about.
These takings are themselves real-world, concrete phenomena–EQ phe-
nomena. They are features of the cognitive EQ character of our experien-
ce, and they, they alone, make it possible for us to get things wrong. They
alone can confer sufficient determinateness on intentionality, determinate-
ness sufficient for making sense of error. The experienceless do not and
cannot get things wrong, so if their states are about anything they’re about
all their causes indiscriminately. When it comes to aboutness and inten-
tionality, consciousness kicks ass.
There are certain complications. If Lucy is contemplating a rock in the mist
which she takes to be a moose, and indeed to be M, then that taking-
something-to-be-a moose, which is also a taking-something-to-be-M, and
which is, as a taking, entirely a matter of cognitive EQ content, is obviously
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not going to settle the question of which of her experience’s local causal
antecedents it is about (i.e. the rock). Fortunately, however, she also takes
it that that thing (the thing she believes to be a moose, and to be M) is a
physical object over there in the mist, and that taking, too, is part of the
content of her experience, and it does allow us to stop at a particular place
as we go back up the chain or cone of causes. The same goes if the thing in
question is just a dark curl in the mist. If the cause of her thought is a
brainstorm, on the other hand, then it is not about that brainstorm, but it is
still about moose, and indeed about M. And so on.
Perception provides the most vivid cases, but the point is general. It’s not
just that the EQ content of my experience allows me to stop (makes it the
case that I stop) at the right object when I am having a perceptual experi-
ence of it. The same holds equally in the case of my thoughts about absent
objects, and in the case of the concepts I deploy in thought – given always
that I am in a certain causal context, am in fact in a real world more or less
as I suppose myself to be. Suppose I am thinking about moose, or about
some particular moose. The EQ character of my thought when I deploy the
concept or thought-element MOOSE in the causal context I am in, makes
the object of my thought determinate in a way that no representation in
any non-experiential being can ever be (obviously the EQ character of my
thought can’t do it all on its own, causal context is essential). This is not to
say that it makes it determinate in some magically absolute way. The claim
is just this: given that we are in a real world more or less as we suppose
ourselves to be, the intentionality of Lucy’s overall experiential state is suf-
ficiently fixed (sufficiently ‘disambiguated’, one might say) by the fact that
she takes it to be experience of M, a moose, and is suitably causally con-
nected to M.
But what exactly is this ‘taking’, that is, you say, part of the content of her experience?
It is an all-pervasive feature of our experience; your current experience is
flooded with it. It is as plain as day, but obscure to philosophers who have
so embrangled the notion of mental content.. It is simply a matter of cogni-
tive EQ content, something that Lucy and Louis have wholly in common,
so far as their M-experience is concerned, although Lucy is thinking about
M and Louis is not. All one has to do, to know what it is, is to think about
what Lucy and Louis have in common, in the case in question (or Lucy and
her experiential duplicate, whom we may now suppose to have no causal
connection to moose at all).
One might say that it is cognitive intent, intentional intent, which is part of
the cognitive-experiential content of a thought, that fixes intentionality in
conjunction with the causal factor. It fixes what the thought is about in its
causal context. It is essential. Nothing else will do. Every other attribution
of intentionality is convenient fiction, ‘intentional-stance’, down-with-me-
taphysics, behaviourist-or-neobehaviourist, don’t-care anti-realism about
mental states. When the robot or zombie comes off the simulator and en-
ters the real world, it doesn’t, to repeat, get anything wrong. Nor does the
UNA that we have allowed that it can be said to have suddenly start to be
about real, concrete, spatio-temporal, distal things in any sense in which it
is not equally about its proximal inputs. The same goes when we put it back
on the simulator. When you and I transfer between real world and simula-
tor, by contrast, all sorts of things change. We are wrong about our situa-
tion, for example, because our intentionality is effectively determinate.
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But how can experience ever deliver determinateness?
It just can. Cognitive experience in causal context can do just this. Such is
its power. Thought is a remarkable thing. The whole philosophical diffi-
culty, for some, is simply to accept this fact; to see that there is absolutely
nothing suspect or question-begging or anti-naturalistic about it. It takes
some getting used to if one has been brought up philosophically in a cer-
tain way.
– But ‘cognitive intent’, if there is such a thing (I don’t really know what you mean) must be
supposed to be non-experiential in many cases if not in most cases; something implicit, part of
the background out of which thought arises, not something that is normally present in any way
in the (EQ) content of conscious experience.
In my use the term stands for something experiential – I’ll call it ‘conscious
cognitive intent’ if you prefer. One can use the phrase ‘cognitive intent’ in a
way that allows it to be non-experiential; and one can think of it as some-
thing that can be wholly latent, when one is thinking, in such a way that
there is no sense in which it is part of the EQ content of one’s thought.
One will first, however, need to acquire a realistic view about how much
can be part of the EQ content of experience without being in the focus of
attention; for this is vastly underestimated in the analytic tradition. And
even when one has done this I will continue to insist that intentionality
comes on the scene only when cognitive intent is part of the EQ content of
thought (stressing, again, how much can be part of the EQ content of expe-
rience without being in the focus of attention); so that whatever non-expe-
riential cognitive intent is, it doesn’t deliver intentionality. Nor does it de-
liver determinate aboutness, for it is subject to all the uncontrollability of
UNA. When there is experiential cognitive intent, by contrast, everything is
transformed.
– ’When there is experiential cognitive intent everything is transformed’. This is magic. You’re
simply asserting that experiential cognitive intent + causal context can constitute intentionali-
ty but that no non-experiential cognitive intent, conceptual capacity, or whatever can in any
context. Your thesis is that when there’s experience, pff!, there’s intentionality.
I’m saying that there’s intentionality only when there’s experience, but I
think I see what you mean. I think you are imagining a case in which every-
thing that can possibly contribute to the existence of intentionality is pre-
sent, including everything that is possible in the way of experiential condi-
tions given that conscious cognitive intent (intentional intent) is absent.
And I think you’re saying that simply adding conscious cognitive intent –
i.e. a mere piece of experiential what-it’s-likeness, albeit cognitive what-
it’s-likeness – could not make the difference.
If so, I disagree. I do hold the pff! thesis. It’s a bit like looking at one of
those pictures where you can’t see what it is a picture of, and then suddenly
you see (to offer an analogy that lies wholly inside the experiential realm).
Suppose Louis is confronting a real scene in the world, and is seeing it, on
account of some temporary mental fugue, just as an array of colours, with-
out even any automatic taking of it as of the real world, without even any
grasp of it as experience of anything at all. No intentionality here, I say,
none at all. Then he comes to, he sees buildings, leaves, whatever it is.
Such ‘brown-study’ fugues, in which intentionality fades to nothing, are not
that uncommon in ordinary life, and one can precipitate them quite easily,
fixing one’s stare and letting go. Total intentional decoupling – because of
the lapse in cognitive EQ content or cognitive intent.
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– But what, for all love, is this cognitive intent? You can’t propose to analyse intentionality in
terms of intent, intentional intent, announce that this intent is essentially experiential, and
that’s it.
Given the way the notion of intentionality has been detached from mind
and experience in current debate, to move from the notion of intentionality
to a notion of intent isn’t to move in anything like a circle of terms; for
there is no intent in the experienceless. And if and in so far it is to move in
a circle it brings insight, given the current debate in analytic philosophy, to
see that this is so. It brings the notion of intentionality home, and it’s a
great step forward to see this – to see that this is home.
– It’s still magic. How can the quality of experience pin things down determinately, or at least
as determinately as you say it can? How can it be any more determinate than behaviour, in
the end, in determining intentionality? You are, at bottom, dreaming.
‘Determinate’ and its cognates are tricky words because they have meta-
physical/ epistemological slippage built in to them. I can’t answer until I’m
sure that you’re not using ‘determinate’ in any (to me uninteresting) episte-
mological sense, only in a metaphysical sense; and that you don’t think, as
so many did in the last century (and perhaps some still do), that a thing
cannot be metaphysically determinate unless it can in principle be episte-
mologically determinate for us human beings.
– I’m not sure you can cut metaphysics off from epistemology like this, but I’ll let it go.
Good, then my answer to your question ‘How can the quality of experience
pin things down determinately’ is: Ah, it just can. That’s how it is. This is
what we do. This is the power of the entirely natural phenomenon of con-
scious thought. My intent (taking) fixes it that I’m thinking about the tree,
not the proximal inputs. If God could look into my mind, he would cer-
tainly know what I was thinking about, given that he also knew – and how
could he not – about my causal circumstances. He could know, given the
EQ character of my experience, that I was thinking about the tree, not any
intervening causal goings on, light waves, optic nerve electrical activity, and
so on.
It may be hard to see – the reality, the power of conscious thought – after
nearly a century of behaviourist and post-behaviourist (functionalist, inter-
pretationist, representationalist) folly. It may seem like mere assertion, or
trying to have something (something impossible) for free. It may seem like
sheer irresponsibility, or a naïve relapse into hopeless old ways of thinking.
It is a return to old ways of thinking, but it is not a relapse and it is not na-
ïve. I think, however, that it will leave a feeling of dissatisfaction, partly be-
cause it terminates in something primitive, not further analysable: the mere
existence of the experiential modality of cognitive experience, the mere ex-
istence of the phenomenon of cognitive EQ content. The only way to make
progress here, I think, is to let go: to see that there is nothing to press for
here, no legitimate philosophical demand that is not being met. The fact
that cognitive experience exists, just as visual and auditory experience exist,
is a fact we encounter (right on our doorstep) in naturalistic investigation.
The key is to see that it raises no greater problem for (evolutionary) natu-
ralism than the existence of any other kind of developed experiential mo-
dality, like vision or hearing. There is no new problem of principle. There
is in the world cognitive EQ content, intentional intent, cognitive-experi-
ential intentional intent, just as there is pain.
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It is plain that dispositional states (e.g. belief dispositions) cannot be inten-
tional states, on the view I have expounded here, and this will worry many.
Terminological habits are as powerful as any in human life, and the way of
talking that allows that dispositional states can be contentful intentional
states is deeply engrained in the idiom of analytic philosophy. Dispositional
states have, indeed, been taken to be the paradigm cases of intentional
phenomena. This is extremely odd, for it is an elementary point that a dis-
position, e.g. the disposition to answer Yes if intending to speak truly when
asked if grass is green, is just not the kind of thing that can possibly be con-
tentful in the way that it needs to be if it is to be an intentional thing – even
if it can be identified as the particular disposition it is only by reference to
the proposition (the content) grass is green, which is itself an (abstract) in-
tentional entity. To think that a disposition is, metaphysically, the kind of
entity that can be contentful in itself, and so intentional, is a bit like think-
ing that an object’s disposition to cause red-experience in human beings in
certain circumstances is itself something red, in the ordinary naïve under-
standing of the term ‘red’; or that if an object has a fragile disposition, then
it already in some sense contains or involves actual breaking. (No one, I
think, will want to turn to the non-experiential, neural categorical ground
of the belief disposition to provide a truly, intrinsically mentally contentful
grass-is-green item.)
There are many more questions to address. There are questions about the
minimal case of intentionality. If we suppose that babies don’t have inten-
tionality while children do we need to make sense of how intentionality
dawns. If we take it (as I do) that cats have intentionality we need to say
something about this; and just as we cannot hope to sort all conscious crea-
tures scientifically into those that definitely have concepts (whatever ex-
actly concepts are) and those that definitely don’t, so too attributions of in-
tentionality will sometimes be irredeemably uncertain. Questions about the
innateness of the object concept, of the sort famously worked on by Spelke,
Leslie and others, will be relevant; and they, no doubt, will link to ques-
tions about the innateness of intentional intent itself. There will be ques-
tions about the intentionality of peripheral awareness, and so on. For now
this is enough.
References:
Bickhard, M. H. (2003) »Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Repre-
sentation«, in Process Theories: Crossdisciplinary Studies in Dynamic Categories, edi-
ted by J. Seibt Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Broad, C. D. (1925) The Mind and Its Place In Nature London: Kegan Paul.
Chalmers, D. & Clark, A. (1998) »The Extended Mind« Analysis 58: 7–19.
Clark, A. (2001) Mindware–An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davies, P. (2001) »Liquid space«, New Scientist, 3 November.
Dennett, D. (1971) »Intentional Systems«, Journal of Philosophy 68: 87–106.
Dennett, D. (1981) »True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works«.
In Scientific Explanation, edited by A.F. Heath Oxford: Oxford University Press.
297SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA G. Strawson, Real Intentionality v.2:40 (2/2005) pp. (279–297) Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness?
Dennett, D. (1991) »Real Patterns« Journal of Philosophy 88: 27–51.Dretske, F.
(1985) »Misrepresentation« in Belief: Form, Content, Function edited by R. Bogdan
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. (2001) »Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet?« Cognition 79: 221–237.
Hume, D. (1748/1975) Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning
the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dretske, F. (1988) Explaining Behavior Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (1995) Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kant, I. (1781–7/1933) Critique of Pure Reason, (translated by N. Kemp Smith),
London: Macmillan.
Loar, B. (2003) »Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content«. In
Reflections and Replies: essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge, edited by Martin
Hahn and Bjorn Ramberg, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1974) The Cement of the Universe Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nagarjuna (c150/1995) The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (translated
with a commentary by Jay Garfield), Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Nagel, T. (1986) The View From Nowhere New York: Oxford University Press.
Papineau, D. (1987) Reality and Representation Oxford: Blackwell.
Pettit, P. & McDowell, J. (1986) »Introduction«. In Subject, Thought, and Context
edited P. Pettit and J. McDowell Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pitt , D. (2004) »The Phenomenology of Cognition, or What is it like to think that
p?«, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Russell, B. (1927a/1992a) The Analysis of Matter London: Routledge.
Russell, B. (1956/1995) »Mind and Matter«, in Portraits from Memory Nottingham:
Spokesman.
Schiffer, S. (1987) Remnants of Meaning Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.
Searle, J. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.
Siewert, C. (1998) The Significance of Consciousness Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Siewert, C. (2002) »Consciousness and Intentionality«, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Smolin, L. (1997) The Life of the Cosmos London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Spelke, M. (1990) »Principles of Object Perception, Cognitive Science 14.
Spelke, M. & Hermer, L. (1996) »Early cognitive development: Objects and space«
in Perceptual and Cognitive Development edited by R. Gelman, T. Kit-Fong et al San
Diego: Academic Press.
Steward, H. (1997) The Ontology of Mind Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Strawson, G. (1986) Freedom and Belief Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Strawson, G. (1994) Mental Reality Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Strawson, G. (2003) »Real materialism«, in Chomsky and his Critics, edited by L.
Antony and N. Hornstein Oxford: Blackwell.
Strawson, G. (2004) »Real intentionality«, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sci-
ences 3: 287–313.
298SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA G. Strawson, Real Intentionality v.2:40 (2/2005) pp. (279–297) Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness?
Strawson, G. (2005) »Intentionality, terminology and experience«. In Phenomeno-
logy and Philosophy of Mind, edited by David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Tho-
masson Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. »Why physicalism entails panpsychism« (forthcoming).
Tye, M. (1995) Ten Problems of Consciousness Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations (translated by G. M. M. Ans-
combe), Oxford: Blackwell.
Galen Strawson
Reale Intentionalität v.2: Warum impliziert
Intentionalität Bewusstsein?
Intentionalität ist ein essenziell mentales, essenziell ereignishaftes und essenziell auf Erfahrung be-
ruhendes (bewusstseinsbetontes) Phänomen. Jeder Versuch, der die Intentionalität charakteri-
sieren will und sie von der bewussten Erfahrung entkoppelt, sieht sich zwei unüberwindbaren
Problemen gegenübergestellt. Erstens muss man einräumen, dass beinahe alles (wenn nicht ge-
radezu alles) Intentionalität besitzt – bis hin zu den subatomaren Partikeln. Zweitens hat dies zur
Folge, dass alles, was Intentionalität besitzt, viel zuviel davon besitzt – ja vielleicht sogar unendlich
viel davon. Der Schlüssel zu einer zufrieden stellenden und wirklich naturalistischen Theorie der
Intentionalität ist (1) ein realistisches Konzept des Naturalismus und (2) ein wohl entwickeltes
Verständnis des Phänomens der kognitiven Erfahrung.
Galen Strawson
Intentionnalité réelle 2: pourquoi l’intentionnalité
entraîne la conscience?
L’intentionnalité est un phénomène essentiellement mental, essentiellement événementiel et essen-
tiellement expérienciel (conscient). Toute tentative de caractérisation de l’intentionnalité qui la
sépare de l’expérience consciente est confrontée à deux problèmes insurmontables. D’abord elle est
obligée de reconnaître que presque tout (sinon tout) – y compris même les particules subatomiques –
est doté d’intentionnalité. En conséquence de quoi, tout ce qui est doté d’intentionnalité en est
beaucoup trop – peut-être infiniment. La clé d’une théorie de l’intentionnalité satisfaisante et
vraiment naturiste est (1) une conception réaliste du naturalisme et (2) une compréhension cor-
rectement développée du phénomène de l’expérience cognitive.
299SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA G. Strawson, Real Intentionality v.2:40 (2/2005) pp. (279–297) Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness?
